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Summary — Rapid development of wireless networks brings about many security problems in Portable 
Communication Systems (PCSs), which can provide mobile users with an opportunity to enjoy global roaming 
services. In this regard, designing a secure user authentication scheme, especially for recognizing legal roaming 
users is indeed a challenging task. It is noticed that, there is no delegation-based protocol for PCSs, which can 
guarantee anonymity, untraceability, perfect forward secrecy and resistance of Denial of Service (DoS) attack. 
Therefore, in this article we put forward a novel delegation-based anonymous and untraceable authentication 
protocol, which can guarantee to resolve all the above mentioned security issues and hence offer a solution for 
secure communications for PCSs. 
Index Terms — Privacy, Anonymity, Untraceability, Authentication, Smartcard, Global mobility networks. 
1. INTRODUCTION
 Portable Communication Systems (PCSs) offer roaming services among wireless communication networks [1-4]. In this 
regard, a mobile user (MU) at first registers his/her legality into a home location register (HLR). Before roaming, MU logins 
the visiting location register (VLR) and VLR validates the user's legality with the help of the registered HLR. If the MU is 
legal, VLR offers services and charges the roaming fee. In this context, an adversary can easily perform more and more 
malicious activities with the existing PCSs by capturing the content of communication without making any physical 
connections to the wireless network. Therefore, the security issue has always been a major concern in wireless networks. It is 
the general trend of the earlier authentication protocols to use the costly public-key cryptosystem systems (PKCs) to offer 
security and privacy to the mobile users [5-10]. In 2005, Based on the PKC, W.B.Lee and Yeh [5] put forward a delegation-
based identification scheme for PCSs, which provides user anonymity. The protocol also ensures low communication cost 
since it is based on the off-line authentication mechanism. However, T.F. Lee et al. [6] investigated the protocol in [5] and 
showed that it is insecure against the impersonation attack. Thereafter, T.F.Lee et al. designed a revised protocol in [6] to 
eliminate the impersonation attack of the protocol in [5]. However, Youn et al. [7], and Wang et al. [8] proved that the 
protocol in [6] cannot tolerate the linkable problem. In addition to that, C.C.Lee et al. [9] analyzed and argued that T.F.Lee et 
al.’s protocol [6] cannot overcome the problem of forward secrecy of the session key, which leads to computation of current 
session key based on the disclosure of a previous session key. C.C. Lee et al. [9] then designed an enhanced protocol to 
dispense with the existing problems of the protocol in [6]. Unfortunately, in this article we show that the protocol in [9] is not 
flexible and robust since it is suffering from some security threats including the Denial of Service (DoS) attack, side channel 
attack, and perfect forward secrecy and untraceability problem. Besides, according to [10], there is no delegation-based 
authentication protocol, which can guarantee untraceability, perfect forward secrecy, and the resistance of DoS attack. In this 
article, we put forward an anonymous and untraceable delegation-based authentication process for PCSs, which can guarantee 
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to resolve all the security issues existing in other delegation-based protocols and even can offer a secure and expeditious PCS 
with the lower computation and communication costs.  
The remainder of this article has been organized as follows. In Section 2, we pinpoint the weaknesses of the protocol proposed 
in [9] . Thereafter, we present our proposed scheme in Section 3, whose security and performance are analyzed in Section 4 
and Section 5, respectively. Finally, a concluding remark is given in Section 6. The abbreviations and cryptographic functions 
used in this article are defined in Table 1. 
Table 1 Notations and Abbreviations 
Symbol Definition 
MU Mobile User 
VLR Visiting Location Register 
HLR Home Location Register 
Secret Key between the MU and HLR 
Secret Key between the VLR and HLR 
Identity of the HLR 
Identity of the VLR 
Session key between VLR and MU 
p A large prime 
q A prime factor of p-1 
g A generator in group 
Encryption of a message M using secret key K 
One-way hash function 
 Exclusive-OR operation 
Concatenation operation 
2. SECURITY WEAKNESSES IN [9]
In this section, we present the several weaknesses of C.C. Lee et al.’s protocol in [9] (shown in Fig. 1), which certainly cause
security concerns in wireless communication system.
2.1. Vulnerable to DoS Attacks
DoS attack [10-11] is an imperative concern, which may occur attributed to the loss of synchronization between MU and HA.
That can be comprehended if the last authentic response message sent by VLR has been interrupted by an adversary, so that
MU cannot receive the message within a specific time period. Unfortunately, C.C. Lee et al.’s protocol cannot resist DoS
attack, where if an adversary interrupts the response message (Step 6 in Fig.1), then MU cannot
receive . In that case, both the HLR and VLR may update their databases with temporary id 
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 then the HLR will not comprehend that. On the other hand, because of the interruption of the message in Step 6, MU 
cannot even acquire the random number n3 and without n3, it is impossible for MU to compute the session key 
Therefore, without having session key and the temporary id , the MU cannot even 
execute the “Off-line Authentication Phase”.  
2.2. Loss of Untraceability 
An orthogonal security arising as a result of mobility is the privacy of the mobile subscriber’s identity and his/her movements. 
For obvious reasons, it is desirable to keep this information secret. In other words, passive eavesdroppers and active intruders 
should not be able to identify or keep track of the user. In fact, it can be argued that even the VLRs should not be privy to 
know any identification information of the user. Unfortunately, in Step 5 of C.C. Lee et al.’s protocol, the VLR receives the 
MU’s latest temporary identity from HLR. Now, if the MU moves to a new VLR, the old VLR can still track him/her. 
In this way, the protocol proposed by C.C. Lee et al. compromises the domain separation [3-4] property, [12] that means 
conspiracy of all the visited domains may cause to identify the movement of the user. Therefore,  C.C. Lee et al.’s protocol 
cannot ensure the untraceability property, which is greatly important for the privacy of the mobile user. 
2.3. No Perfect Forward Secrecy 
Perfect forward secrecy [13] is a form of security requirements in network systems. In general, a protocol that provides perfect 
forward secrecy (PFS) can resist an adversary from learning any previous session keys, especially when the long term secret 
keying material is compromised by the adversary. However, we found that C.C. Lee et al.’s protocol for PCSs fails to provide 
PFS. In C.C. Lee et al.’s delegation-based protocol, once the secret key pair (K, 𝜎) is disclosed, then all the previous session 
keys established based on the execution “On-line Authentication Phase” will be exposed. Precisely, an adversary can learn the 
previous session key if the home agent is compromised by the adversary. So that, the adversary may acquire secret key pair (K, 
𝜎) and/or the shared secret key . Therefore, the session key in this scheme is not secure. In fact, W.B. Lee and Yeh’s 
scheme [5] and T. F. Lee et al.’s scheme [6] also cannot ensure PFS. 
2.4. Vulnerable to Side Channel Attacks 
In practice, it is possible to read some sensitive information from SIM card by executing the side channel attacks [14], and the 
information can be used for breaking the whole system. Hence, it is highly desirable to use countermeasures for securing the 
secret values stored in SIM card. However, sometimes, developers do not use countermeasures due to expensive production 
cost. In this regard, the best alternative plan is to ensure the security of unspoiled SIM cards by restricting the damage caused 
by the revelation of sensitive information. Unfortunately, C.C. Lee et al.’s delegation-based protocol can be entirely broken, 
since an adversary can always recover the key pair , the latest temporary identity of the MU i.e. , and even the 
latest hash chain values with the session key  from the SIM card. Once the adversary obtains these parameters, then he/she 
can easily impersonate as MU, which is a serious threat against the privacy of the mobile user. Similar problem can also be 
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Fig. 1 The On-line Authentication Process of C.C. Lee et al.’s Protocol 
3. PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
 
To mitigate the security and functionality issues in the existing solutions, in this article we design a novel authentication 
protocol for PCSs. The list of notations is explained in Table 1. Our protocol consists of three phases. In Phase I, a MU 
registers to a HLR and then the HLR issues a smartcard for the MU. The Phase II, which is an on-line authentication phase, is 
executed when a MU roams into a foreign network to obtain the ubiquitous services and in this situation, the VLR 
authenticates the MU with the support of the HLR. The Phase III, which is an off-line authentication phase, is executed when 
a MU roams into a foreign network and the current VLR authenticates the MU without any help from the HLR. The design 
goals of our protocol can be summarized in the following ways: 
 
• It provides mutual authentication; 
• It ensures user anonymity with the resistance of DoS attacks; 
• It provides privacy against eavesdropper (PAE); 
• It resists different attacks and provides forward/backward secrecy; 
• It offers perfect forward secrecy; 




A.  Phase I: Registration Phase 
For registration, a new MU submits his/her identity  to a particular HLR using a secure channel. Then the HLR selects a 
nonce , and calculates  Furthermore, the HLR generates a set of unlinkable pseudo-identities and 
emergency key pairs  for the corresponding MU. Besides, the 
HLR maintains a transaction sequence number  and it is calculated depending on the number of authentication requests (m) 
handled by the HLR, including the present request of the current MU. For every request, the HLR sets  and 
 and subsequently sends  to the MU while maintaining a copy of it in its database. This sequence number will 
help HLR to identify the consumer. Besides, based on that, the HLR can also take decision on whether a MU’s request is 
valid. If the  provided by MU is not valid, then HLR instantly aborts the request and the MU will be asked to use his/her 
one of the unused pair of ( , ). Once a pair is consumed, then that pair must be deleted from the list by both the MU 
and the HLR. Now, the HLR personalizes a smartcard with and delivers it to the MU securely for 
further communication. The HLR stores both the MU ID and the smartcard, i.e. a copy of  into 
the database. Upon receiving the smartcard, the MU generates a nonce , and pre-computes a hash chain 
and stores them in its database, where and  for i = 1, 2, …,n. 
Thereafter, the MU selects a low-entropy password  and 
calculates Finally, the MU replaces 
with , PID with , and  with then the smartcard finally holds . 
B. Phase II: On-line Authentication Phase 
This phase is needed to authenticate a MU by the VLR with the help of HLR when the MU roams into the region of a FN. 
In this phase, the VLR authenticates the MU and the HLR and the MU mutually computes a session key . This phase 
consists of the following steps: 
Step 1  
MU at first picks from its database and then keys the smartcard into the device and inputs  and  
The smartcard then calculates  Hereafter, it derives  
 As a final point, the MU delivers the authentication message  to the VLR over a public channel. 
If there is a loss of synchronization between the MU and the VLR, the MU selects an unused pair of  and then 
inputs  and  into the smartcard. The smartcard then calculates   
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           Fig. 1. Proposed on-line authentication process
 Subsequently, the smartcard sets  and . In this case, the MU 
needs not to send  in . 
Step 2  
After receiving , the VLR selects a random number  and then encrypts 
 by using its own key, i.e.,  Hereafter, the MU computes 
and then sends authentication message to the corresponding HLR, where the MU 
registered earlier, to verify the legitimacy of the MU. 
Step 3  
Upon receiving , the HLR decrypts and at first checks whether  is valid. If so, 
then the HLR subsequently computes and verifies whether  are valid. If the verification is successful then 
the HLR generates a nonce n3 then derives the 
following,   
 . After that, the HLR compose a response message   and sends 
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the message to the VLR. Finally, the HLR computes and updates 
its database with , and In case if the  is missing in the message , then the HLR will first 
validate  and then try to recognize the  in . If the reorganization of the  is unsuccessful, then the HLR 
aborts the execution of the proposed protocol and requests the MU to retry with a valid and unused pair of ( . 
However, if the reorganization of the  is successful, then the HLR selects a random a new shared key randomly 
and encodes it as and sends x with other parameters in  In this case, the  is calculated as 
 
Step 4  
On receiving from the HLR, the VLR decrypts  and obtains l and Hereafter the VLR checks that weather  is 
equal to  or not. If so, then it sets and generates a temporary identity for the MU and then 
computes . Subsequently, the VLR sends the response message to the MU. If the VLR cannot validate 
the response parameter, then it will terminate the execution of the protocol. Finally, the VLR updates with 
 The loss of synchronization between the VLR and the HLR may happen and it can be detected if 
the VLR does not receive  within a specific time-period. In that case, the VLR asks the HLR for the new secret shared 
key, i.e., , which will be sent to the VLR securely. 
On accepting , the MU decrypts  and gets , , and the new transaction sequence number . Then, the MU 
calculates and verifies whether it is equal to . If so, then the MU derives 
 and validates . If the verification is successful, then the MU takes  as the session key. 
Otherwise, it terminates the execution of the protocol. Finally, the MU updates his/her database with shared secret key 
and new transaction sequence number  Now, if an unused and valid 
pair of is delivered with the message , the MU will also receive a new shared key as 
. The MU then computes as  and stores it for future communication. If 
any verification described above fails then this phase will be terminated. If all the verifications are successful, then we can 
claim that the mutual authentication between the MU and the VLR is correctly performed and a secure session key SK is 
established between them. We further depicted this phase in Fig. 2. 
C. Phase III: Off-line Authentication Phase 
This phase is almost similar to the protocol proposed in [6] except that in our protocol only the VLR maintains the temporary 
identity for the MU. Therefore, unlike the protocol in [6], the VLR in our protocol does not send any temporary identity 
 to the HLR. This phase can be described as follows. 
Step 1  
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 The MU selects  and  from its own database and delivers to the VLR, where is the 
session key between the MU and the VLR. The VLR computes using and . Subsequently, the VLR verifies 
whether is equal to l. If , the VLR updates as and , where . In 
this case, the VLR computes the session key as , selects a new random and temporary identity and 
accordingly updates the verification table. The VLR then delivers to the MU.  
Step 2  
Upon receiving , the MU obtains  by decrypting the using the session key and 
subsequently updates the smartcard with the new temporary identity for next communication process.  
4. SECURITY EVALUATION  
In this section, we analyze our protocol to show that it holds different security properties and functionality requirements to 
offer a secure and flexible authentication environment for PCSs.  
a. Mutual Authentication  
In our protocol, the HLR authenticates the MU by examine and  in the request message . A legal MU 
only can construct a valid request message in the message . In addition to that, if the synchronization between the 
MU and the VLR is lost due to various reasons, the HLR authenticates the MU by using the unused pseudo identity  in 
 and by checking whether the is equal to  Furthermore, the MU examines the authenticity of the 
HLR by checking whether the  is equal to  Now, the HLR authenticates the VLR by 
verifying  similarly, the VLR authenticates the HLR by using , which must be equal to . From the 
above discussion, it can be argued that our authentication protocol for PCSs achieves the mutual authentication attribute. 
b. PAE with User Anonymity and Untraceability 
Based on the literature, user anonymity falls into two categories: weak anonymity and strong anonymity.  In case of weak one, 
an adversary has no capability to know the real identities of the mobile users, but using their temporary identities can be traced 
by the adversary. On the other hand, in case of the strong anonymity, the adversary should not be able to trace an entity by 
using their temporary identities used in different sessions. The existing standard 3G UMTS [3] cannot ensure anonymity 
during authentication since when current VLR refuses to accept the Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) of MU, it 
forces him/her to provide the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) which reveals the real identity of the MU to the 
VLR. In our proposed delegation-based protocol, we unitize the concept of one-time-alias identity , which will be 
different in each transaction. No one except the HLR knows the mobile user’s real identity . Furthermore, even if the MU 
visits a VLR multiple times, the VLR is still unable to identify the mobile user. In this way, we ensure user anonymity along 
with the PAE [13] support in our proposed scheme.  
c. Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) 
In our proposed scheme, we accomplish PFS by regular updating the shared secrets  and . At the end of each 
transaction, these keys are updated using the hash function. If any of the secret keys is compromised, because of the one-way 
characteristic of the hash function, adversary cannot acquire from and  from the . Accordingly, our 
protocol achieves the PFS of the session key [14-15] and ultimately provides the guarantee of the secrecy of the old session 
keys. 
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d. Resistance to DoS Attack 
Any loss of synchronization between the MU and the HLR may bring in DoS attacks [10-12]. Usually, one of the ways to 
comprehend if there is any DoS attack or not, is by checking that whether the response message  has been received in a 
maximum roundtrip time. For dealing with this attack, we utilize the concept of un-linkable pseudo-IDs and emergency key 
pairs   It may also happen that the adversary destroys the unsinkability by 
continuously listen on the communication media and interrupt the connections. It is a trade-off in wireless communications 
and this kind of failure can be reduced to lower limit by updating the emergency keys and the transaction sequence numbers. If 
all the pairs are already used, then the HLR must handover a set of pseudo-identity and emergency key pairs to the MU via a 
secure channel. 
e. Insider Attack 
Usually, it is possible that more than one user selects the same password for accessing different application servers for 
convenience. Now, if a privileged insider of the HLR knows the password of the MU, she/he may try to impersonate the MU 
by accessing other application servers where the same mobile user is a registered user. For dealing with this attack, the MU of 
our protocol does not submit her/his password to the HLR during registration, thus a privileged insider of the HLR could not 
get the password of the MU. Therefore, insider attack has been prevented by our protocol. 
f. Security Assurance in Case of Lost Smartcard 
In general, when a smartcard is lost or stolen by someone, then the secret parameters stored in the smartcard can be obtained 
through the intelligent side channel attacks [16].  In our protocol, if the smartcard of a MU is lost/stolen, the attacker does not 
find and of the MU. Furthermore, the adversary cannot calculate the secrets 
 or and  without 
knowing and  . Therefore, the smartcard lost attack is resisted in our protocol. 
5. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The main intension to design a new protocol is to eliminate the security and privacy threats found in the existing 
authentication protocols for PCSs and to assure lower communication and computation costs. Therefore, we compared our 
protocol with several contemporary similar protocols in [5,6,8,9] to provide a clear view about the merits of our protocol. To 
reflect the security and functionality benefits, we compared our delegation-based authentication protocols for PCSs with the 
related protocols in [5,6,8,9], and the comparative result is addressed in Table II. The Table II demonstrates that the required 
functionality and security attributes are integrated with the proposed protocol, whereas other existing protocols are lacking 
some of these properties. In contrast, even though all the delegation-based authentication protocols in [5,6,8,9] can ensure 
“mutual authentication” property, they fail to achieve some other essential functionality and security attributes including, 
“user anonymity”, “robustness against insider attacks”, “robustness against side-channel attacks”, and “perfect forward 
secrecy” “resistance of DoS attacks”, which are deeply important in order to ensure secure roaming services for PCSs.  
Table II  

















W.B. Lee and Yeh [5] 
Yes No No No No No 
 
T. F. Lee et al. [6] 
Yes No No No No No 
 
R. C. Wang et al. [8] 
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C.C. Lee et al. [9] 
Yes Yes No No No No 
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SP: Security Property; SP1: Mutual Authentication; SP2: Forward Secrecy; SP3: Strong Anonymity; SP4: Robust Against 
Insider Attacks; SR5: Robust Against Side-Channel Attacks; SR6: Perfect Forward Secrecy with the Resistance of DoS 
Attacks;  
TABLE III 
PERFORMANCE BENCHMARKING BASED ON COMPUTATION COST DURING THE EXECUTION OF ON-LINE AUTHENTICATION 
PROCESS 
Scheme Mobile VLR HLR 
W.B. Lee and Yeh 
[5] 
   
T. F. Lee et al. [6]  
 
 
R.C. Wang et al. [8]  
 
 
C.C. Lee et al. [9]    
Ours    
 
TABLE IV 
COMPUTATION OVERHEAD OF THE VARIOUS CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS 
Cryptographic Operation CPU Cycles Execution Time 
Hash operation (SHA-256) 
  
Symmetric key encryption/decryption (AES-CBC)   
Modular exponential operation    
Modular multiplication Operation)   
 
 
Here, we argued that the performance against the computation of our protocol is more efficient than previous protocols 
proposed in [5,6,8,9], and the comparative result is shown in Table III. In particular, our protocol does not utilize the modular 
exponential operation or modular multiplication, which demand high computation cost than other cryptographic operations. As 
an alternative, our protocol utilizes the symmetric key tools such as, hash function and encryption, which require less 
computation cost compared to any modular operation. To elaborate the performance of our delegation-based authentication 
protocol, here we have executed the different cryptographic operations, which are integrated with the design of our protocol 
and the protocols in [5,6,8,9] as well using Java Cryptographic Extension (JCE) [17] on a smartphone of HTC Desire as a 
testbed. The smartphone runs Android 2.2 mobile OS and equipped with 0.72 GHZ Arm Cortex-A8 CPU and the outcomes are 
summarized in Table IV. The Table IV clearly demonstrates that hash function and symmetric key encryption/decryption 
cause significantly less communicational overhead as compared to any modular operations. Moreover, it should be noted that, 
all the state of the art protocols in [5,6,8,9] exchanged six messages during the execution of the on-line phase. On the contrary, 
our protocol exchanged only four messages between MU, VLR, and HLR during execution of the on-line authentication phase. 
As a result, communication cost of the proposed protocol is much less than the protocols in [5,6,8,9]. Accordingly, we can 
argue that our protocol has significantly outperformed the protocols presented in [5,6,8,9] in all aspects. Therefore, our 
protocol is much suitable to provide secure and flexible roaming facilities to the mobile users in PCSs. 
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According to literature reviews, existing delegation-based protocols for PCS environments fail to provide some important 
security and functionality properties such as mutual authentication, PFS, resistance to DoS attacks, resistance to insider attack, 
and side-channel-attacks. Besides, the existing protocols also violate the PAE with user anonymity and untraceability, where 
the MU is still traceable by the old VLR, even if the MU moves to a new VLR. As a result, these protocols infringe the 
privacy issues of the mobile users. We put forward a new delegation based authentication protocol for PCS environments to 
avoid the above-mentioned issues of the mobile users. The comparative discussion made in the previous section exhibits 
resilience against known security threats and our protocol can even guarantee reasonable computational and communication 
overhead. Hence, it can be much suitable for portable communication systems. 
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